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I. INTRODUCTION

On July 2, 1998, officials at the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA"), the federal agency responsible for administering the Medicaid program,' mandated that state Medicaid programs provide coverage for the impotency drug Viagra. 2 The
HCFA's announcement has proven very controversial, encountering
resistance from many states who view the mandate as financially
impairing their ability to provide other Medicaid services. 3 Man1. Medicaid, a program created by the federal government in Title XIX of the Social Security Act, authorizes the expenditure of federal funds to aid states in providing medical services to
needy people. Linda M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home: State Constitutionsand Medicaid Fundingfor
Abortions, 26 N.M. L. REV. 433, 434 (1996).
2. Drug Policy: Medicaid Coverage of Viagra at http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/drugs/drpolicy.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2000) C'[The law requires that a State's Medicaid
program cover Viagra ....")[hereinafter Drug Policy]; see also Carole L. Stewart, Mandated
Medicaid Coverage of Viagra:Raising the Issues of Questionable Priorities,the Need for a Definition ofMedical Necessity, and the Politicsof Poverty, 44 LOY. L. REV. 611, 612 (1998).
3. Stewart, supra note 2, at 612-13. For example, a spokeswoman for the Michigan Department of Community Health expressed concern that complying with the federal mandate
would "cost [Michigan] $14 million a year-$14 million [they] could spend on maternal and infant services or people with HIV." Robert Pear, New York and Wisconsin Will Defy FederalDirective to Provide Viagra Through Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1998, at A12. Likewise, an attor-
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dated Medicaid coverage of Viagra is also curious, considering that
the Medicaid statute specifically permits states to exclude fertility
drugs, a category of drugs into which Viagra falls, from coverage
under state Medicaid programs. 4 Moreover, most states do in fact
decline to cover these drugs. 5

Although Viagra primarily treats erectile dysfunction, it also
treats male infertility in distinct cases.6 Thus, the HCFA mandate
essentially results in states providing Medicaid coverage of a male
fertility drug while excluding female fertility drugs from coverage. 7
With its mandate,8 the HCFA has given female Medicaid recipients a constitutional aid with which to challenge the states' exclusion of female fertility drugs from Medicaid coverage. This Note
identifies the potential constitutional causes of action women have
against the discrepancy in Medicaid coverage, and assesses the
likelihood that their arguments will succeed.
Part II of this Note explores the history of the Medicaid program as well as its current statutory construct. It discusses the
general purpose of the program and its attempt to provide medical
assistance to "categorically" as well as to "medically" needy individuals. The interaction between the federal and state governments
in implementing and administering Medicaid programs is also explored in this part of the Note, with an emphasis on the federal
government's ability to dictate the terms of state Medicaid programs. Finally, Part II discusses the federal Medicaid guidelines
with respect to states' prescription drug coverage under their individualized Medicaid programs.
Part III addresses the problem of infertility in the United
States. It focuses on the prevalence of infertility in distinct socioeconomic groups and explores the various types of fertility drugs
used to aid women suffering from cettain reproductive abnormali-

ney with the New Haven Legal Assistance Association found it "very disturbing that the White
House would allow states ...to ration care for quadriplegics and people ith cerebral palsy or
Lou Gehrig's disease who need special medical equipment to keep them alive" while mandating
coverage for Viagra. Id.

4. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(2)(B)Cii)(1994) CThe following drugs or
classes of drugs, or their medical uses, may be excluded from coverage or otherwise restricted...
[a]gents when used to promote fertility.").
5. See Andy Miller, Iriagrato be Covered by Georgia Mfedicaid, ATLANrTA J. & CONST., July
29, 1998, at 03D; NA'L CrR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, Feds to States: Pay for Viagra, at

http://wv.ncpa.orglhealthlpdh/july98a.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2001).
6. See infra Part IV (discussing Viagra in detail).
7. For examples of female fertility drugs excluded from Medicaid coverage, see Part II.C.
8. See DrugPolicy, supranote 2 and accompanying text.
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ties. Part III concludes with a discussion of both federal and state
policies regarding Medicaid coverage of fertility drugs.
Part IV begins with an overview of the drug Viagra and its
treatment of erectile dysfunction in men. The Note also discusses
the HCFA's reasons for determining that state Medicaid programs
should be required to cover Viagra, and it explores the states' reactions to the HCFA's mandate. Part IV ends with a discussion of the
classification of Viagra as a male fertility drug.
Part V discusses the possibility of female Medicaid recipients
bringing constitutional challenges to a state's exclusion of fertility
drugs from Medicaid coverage in light of the HCFA's mandated coverage of Viagra. Part V.A first addresses a possible claim that the
discrepancy in coverage violates female Medicaid recipients' substantive due process rights; however, the Note quickly dismisses
this argument because of its probable failure. Next, the Note examines the more plausible claim of an equal protection violation.
Part V.B describes the traditional equal protection construct used
by the Court, including the standards of scrutiny applicable to various equal protection challenges. The Note proceeds to apply the
traditional equal protection construct to a possible challenge of
state Medicaid programs' refusal to cover fertility drugs in light of
the federally mandated coverage of Viagra. As such, the Note argues that the inequality created by this situation deserves a higher
standard of scrutiny than the traditional intermediate level of scrutiny used for gender classifications. It then proceeds to apply this
higher level of scrutiny to the current situation to determine the
likelihood that the Court would rule in the plaintiffs favor.
Part VI of the Note determines that a state's refusal to cover
female fertility drugs under its Medicaid program-while at the
same time covering Viagra-violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The Note then concludes with a discussion of a state's options as it
attempts to comply with constitutional equal protection guarantees.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAID PROGRAM

A. The Purpose of the Medicaid Program
fn 1965, Congress created Medicaid under Title XIX of the
Social Security Act. 9 The Medicaid program seeks "to enable each

9.
Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 343-53 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994)).
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State, as far as practicable, to furnish medical assistance to indi-

viduals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the
costs of necessary medical services."1 0

Title XIX provides medical assistance to two classes of people: the "categorically needy" and the "medically needy." 1 The statute requires that states electing to participate in the Medicaid program provide assistance to the "categorically needy," and it permits
participating states to elect whether to provide benefits to the
"medically needy."1 2 The "categorically needy" include families with
dependent children eligible for public assistance under the Aid to

Families with Dependent Children Program,13 and the aged, blind,
and disabled who are eligible for benefits under the Supplemental
Security Income program. 14 Typically, to be categorically needy for

Medicaid purposes, most recipients must fall below the federal poverty level.15 Meanwhile, the "medically needy" include those pa-

tients who are above the poverty level but who are either blind, disabled or members of families with dependent children, and also
those whose income after deducting medical expenses falls below
16
the poverty level.

10. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (stating that Medicaid
is designed to permit states "to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insuffident to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to
help such families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or self-care.. ..
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A).
12. See id.; see also Correll v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 418 S.E.2d 232, 234 (N.C. 1992) (noting
that a state electing to participate in the Medicaid program must provide medical assistance to
the "categorically needy" and has the option of providing benefits to the "medically needy").
13. See Aid to Families With Dependent Children (5180), at http'21vwwvt.lao.ca.govfchc5180.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2000). The Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program
"provides cash grants to families and children whose incomes are not adequate to meet their
basic needs." Id. Families can qualify for the Program if they 1) "have a child who is financially
needy due to the death, incapacity, or continued absence of one or both parents.. ' or 2) 'have a
child who is financially needy due to the unemployment of one or both parents." Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(i).
15. See Julie F. Kay, Note, If Men Could Get Pregnant.An Equal ProtectionModel for FederalFundingof Abortion Undera NationalHealth CarePlan,60 BROOK. L. REV. 349, 353 (1994).
16. George F. Indest III, Legal Aspects of HCFA's Decision to Allow Recovery From Children
for Medicaid Benefits Delivered to their Parentsthrough State FinancialResponsibility Statutes:
A Case of Bad Rule Making through Failureto Comply with the Administrative ProcedureAct, 15
S.U. L, REV. 225, 229 (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(fii).
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B. Federal/StateCooperationand the Medicaid Program
The Medicaid program receives joint funding from the federal and state governments. 17 The federal government reimburses
states for a portion of their Medicaid expenditures at a rate established by the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), 18
and states typically receive reimbursement for fifty to eighty-three
percent of Medicaid expenditures.19
Although states may elect not to participate in the Medicaid
program, if a state does decide to participate, it must comply with
all federal statutory and administrative rules. 20 More specifically,
these federal regulations mandate that states choosing to participate in the Medicaid program furnish five general types of services
to qualified individuals: (1) various inpatient services; (2) "outpatient hospital services;" (3) "other laboratory and X-ray services;"
(4) nursing and clinic services, including "family planning services;"
and (5) various "physicians' services." 21 Furthermore, state Medicaid agencies may not "arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a required service . .. to an otherwise eligible re-

cipient solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or
condition." 22 States may, however, place "appropriate limits on a
[required] service based on such criteria as medical necessity or on
utilization control procedures." 23

17.

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(2) (stating that states must provide funding for at least 40% of

their own Medicaid program expenditures).
18. See Rachel B. Gold & Daniel Daley, Public Funding of Contraceptive,Sterilization and
Abortion Services, Fiscal Year 1990, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 204, 204-05 (1991).
19. See id.
20. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 n.1 (1985) ('Once a State voluntarily chooses to

participate in Medicaid, the State must comply with the requirements of Title XIX and applicable regulations."); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) C'Although participation in the

Medicaid program is entirely optional, once a State elects to participate, it must comply with the
requirements of Title XIX."); Stewart, supranote 2, at 614.
21. 42 U.S.C. §1396d(a)(1-25).

Basic or mandatory Medicaid services generally include inpatient hospital
services; outpatient hospital services; prenatal care; vaccines for children;
physician services; nursing facility services for persons aged 21 or older, family
planning services, rural health clinic services, home health care for person eligible for skilled nursing services; laboratory and x-ray services; pediatric and
family nurse practitioner services; nurse midwife services; Federally-qualified
health center services and early and periodic screening, diagnosis and treatment (EPSDT) services for children under age 21.
Claudia Schlosberg & Sareena Jerath, National Health Law Program (NHELP), Fact Sheet.
PrescriptionDrug Coverage underMedicaid, at n.2 (July 1999), at http://nhelp.orgpubs/1999080
8MedicaidDrugs.html.
22. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (1999).
23. Id.
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C. PrescriptionDrug Coverage Under State Medicaid Programs
Medicaid classifies prescription drugs as "optional
services";2 yet, if a state decides to cover prescription drug services
in its program, the state must comply with federal guidelines in
doing so. 25 These federal guidelines provide that most prescription
drugs should be covered under Medicaid statutes if they have been
approved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). 26 The
guidelines, however, permit states to exempt FDA-approved drugs
from their Medicaid programs in a variety of instances.2 First,
states need not provide payment for prescription drugs if "the prescribed use is not for a medically accepted indication."2 Second,
states are not required to cover prescription drugs that are "subject
to such restrictions pursuant to an agreement between a manufacturer and a State authorized by the Secretary [of Health and Human Services]. "29 Third, states are not required to cover prescription drugs that have been specifically excluded by the federal Medicaid statute.30

24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a); see also Schlosberg & Jerath, supra note 21 (noting that prescription drugs are optional services along with home health services, dental services, diagnostic
services, clinic services, intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded, prosthetic devices,
rehabilitation and physical therapy services, hospice care, case management services, respiratory care services, and alcohol and drug treatment). A state that decides to provide certain optional services is eligible to receive matching federal funds. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(54) ("]nthe case of a State plan that provides medical assistance
for covered outpatient drugs ....[the State must] comply with the applicable requirements of
section 1396r-8 of [Title XIX].").
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(2)(A)(l) (stating that a covered outpatient drug is one "which is
approved for safety and effectiveness as a prescription drug under section 505 or 507 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act").
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d) (listing limitations on drug coverage).
28. Id. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(B)(i). The statute defines a medically accepted indication as "any use
for outpatient drug which is approved under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21
U.S.C_.A § 301 et. seq.] or the use of which is supported by one or more citations included or
approved for inclusion in [the American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information, the
United States Pharmacopeia.Drug Information, or the American Medical Association Drug
Evaluations]." Id. § 1396r-8(k)(6).
29. Id. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(B)(iii). In order for payment to be available from the federal Medicaid program to the states for covered outpatient drugs, the manufacturer of the drug must have
entered into a rebate agreement, as provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(b), with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, on behalf of states. Id. § 1396r-8(a)(1). The rebate agreement requires the manufacturer to provide a specified rebate for covered outpatient drugs dispensed by
the manufacturer during a given period of time that were paid for under the State Medicaid
plan. Id. § 1396r-8(b)(1)(A). The agreement also requires the state to report to the "manufacturer not later than 60 days after the end of each rebate period... information on the total number of units of each dosage form and strength and package size of each covered outpatient drug
... for which payment was made under the plan during the period...." Id. § 1396r-8(b)(2)(A).
30. Id. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(B)Cii). Pursuant to the statute,
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The federal guidelines also allow states some flexibility in
limiting the amount, duration, and scope of those prescription
drugs whose coverage is required under the federal Medicaid program.3 ' States typically use this flexibility to limit access to prescription drugs in four ways: (1) by limiting the number of prescriptions that a beneficiary can have filled in a given time period;3 2 (2)
by imposing co-payments for prescription drugs;3 3 (3) by restricting
access to specified drugs; 3 4 and (4) by requiring prior approval of a

prescription drug before it is dispensed for any medically accepted
35
indication.
D. Review of State Medicaid Programsby the Federal Government
Title XIX requires that states submit medical assistance
plans 36

for approval by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 37 In 1984, however, the Secretary of the HHS delegated his

authority to carry out federal Medicaid duties under Title XIX to

3
the Administrator of the HCFA, an agency within the HHS. 8

[t]he following drugs or classes of drugs, or their medical uses, may be excluded
from coverage or otherwise restricted: (A) Agents when used for anorexia,
weight loss, or weight gain. (B) Agents when used to promote fertility. (C)
Agents when used for cosmetic purposes or hair growth. (D) Agents when used
for the symptomatic relief of cough and colds. (E)Agents when used to promote
smoking cessation. (F) Prescription vitamins and mineral products, except prenatal vitamins and fluoride preparations. (G) Nonprescription drugs. (H) Cov.
ered outpatient drugs which the manufacturer seeks to require as a condition of
sale that associated tests or monitoring services be purchased exclusively 'from
the manufacturer or its designee. (I) Barbiturates. (J) Benzodiazepines.
Id. § 1396r-8(d)(2).
31. See Schlosberg & Jerath, supranote 21.
32. Federal law allows a state to "impose limitations, with respect to all such drugs in a
therapeutic class, on the minimum or maximum quantities per prescription or on the number of
refills, if such limitations are necessary to discourage waste, and may address instances of fraud
or abuse by individuals .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(6).
33. States are prohibited from charging certain recipients, such as minors and pregnant
women, co-payments; states also cannot charge co-payments for specified categories of services,
such as family planning services. Schlosberg & Jerath, supranote 21.
34. See discussion supra notes 27-30.
35. Federal law only permits a state to require prior approval "if the system for providing
such approval (a) provides response by telephone or other telecommunication device within 24
hours of a request for prior authorization, and (b)... provides for the dispensing of at least a 72hour supply of a covered outpatient drug in an emergency situation." 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(5).
36. A medical assistance plan provides information such as which individuals will be eligible for state Medicaid benefits, what services will be provided under the state's Medicaid pro.
gram, and the rates to be charged for various services. Id. § 1396a(a).
37. Id. § 1396a (setting forth the standards for states' medical assistance plans); see also
Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Wessman, No. A3-94-36, 1995 WL 465830, at *1 (D.N.D.
Mar. 15, 1995).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1302.
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Hence, the HCFA Administrator both interprets the Medicaid statute and also determines whether a state's Medicaid plan meets the
federal requirements. 39 If he or she determines that the plan meets
the federal requirements, the state will receive federal funding as
long as it administers the Medicaid program within federal parameters.40 Conversely, if the HCFA Administrator determines that the
federal requirements are not met, he or she may issue an official
disapproval of the plan. 41 A state whose Medicaid program has been
disapproved may seek both administrative and judicial review of
42
the disapproval.
E. Challenges to FederalMedicaid Requirements Under the
Administrative ProceduresAct
In 1946, Congress passed the Administrative Procedures Act
43
("APA") to provide for judicial review of federal agency decisions.
According to the APA, a personM who has suffered a legal wrong or
who has been adversely affected or aggrieved by some federal
agency action is entitled to judicial review of the agency action or
decision.45 Two United States Supreme Court cases set forth the
scope of judicial review of federal agency decisions as well as detail
the appropriate deference to be accorded such decisions: Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 46 and Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 47 In Overton Park, the

Court held that courts reviewing agency decisions should refrain
from "de novo" review and instead review the case on the basis of
the administrative record-unless the reviewing court is evaluating
an "adjudicatory" agency decision and the agency's fact-finding pro-

39. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (1999).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 430.15(c). Official disapproval of a state's

Medicaid program may result in the
state being denied federal reimbursement for expenditures under its Medicaid program. Louisiana v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 877, 878 (5th Cir. 1990).
42. Dep't of Health & Human Serus., 905 F.2d at 878 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming Louisiana's
authority to seek administrative and judicial review of the HCFA Administrator's disapproval of
Louisiana's Medicaid program).
43. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1994 & Supp. IL 1996).
44. "Person" is defined as "an individual, partnership, corporation, or public or private organization other than an agency." Id. § 551 (1994).
45. See id. § 702 (1994).
46. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (involving judicial review of a decision by the United States Secretary of Transportation).
47. Chevron U.S.A_, Inc., v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (involving judicial review of an Environmental Protection Agency action).
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cedures are inadequate. 48 Meanwhile, in Chevron, the Court held
that a reviewing court must defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of a statute and may only invalidate a federal agency's
interpretation that is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
49
to the statute."
Moreover, in Sullivan v. Everhart, the Court held that the
Chevron doctrine applies to judicial review of decisions made by the
Secretary of HHS. 50 Furthermore, the standard of review for the
Secretary of HHS and the Administrator of the HCFA's decisions
regarding the Medicaid program has generally been that of only
overturning actions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."'"
III. MEDICAID COVERAGE OF FEMALE FERTILITY DRUGS
The medical community defines infertility as being unable to
conceive an intrauterine pregnancy after attempting to do so for
twelve months. 52 Infertility results from medical conditions in either the male or female partner, or both; however, fifty to seventy
48. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415 ('[D]e nova review is [only] authorized when the action is
adjudicatory in nature and the agency fact-finding procedures are inadequate.").
49. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (1984).
50. Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 89 (1990) (stating that the Chevron "principles apply
fully to the Secretary's administration of the Ace'); see generallySchweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453
U.S. 34 (1981) (deferring to the Secretary of thd HHS' decision in promulgating regulations under his authority as delegated by Congress); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977)
(stating that a court is not entitled to "set aside ... regulations simply because it would have
interpreted the statute in a different manner").
51. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) (providing the standard of review used for governmental
agency decisions). See generallyNew Mexico Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 4 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 1993) (challenging the disapproval by the Secretary of HHS of a

Medicaid plan amendment for calculating financial eligibility of married Medicaid applicants
using property law); Utah Dep't of Health v. Health Care Fin. Admin., No. 899531, 1991 WL
80901 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1991) (challenging disapproval of a proposed amendment to the Utah
Medicaid plan); Louisiana v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 877 (5th Cire 1990)
(challenging the HCFA's disapproval of a proposed amendment to its Medicaid plan to estimate
pharmacist's acquisition costs for certain drugs); Stewart, supra note 2, 621-22 (discussing the
Court's ruling in Sullivan).
52. Lisa M. Kerr, Can Money Buy Happiness? An Examination of the Coverageof Infertility
Services Under HMO Contracts,49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 601 (1999) (defining infertility as
the "inability to conceive an intrauterine pregnancy after a year of sexual intercourse without
contraceptives"); ADVANCED REPRODUCTIVE CARE (ARC), What is Infertility and Who Can Help
You?, at http://www.fertilityusa.com/what-isLinfertility.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2001). One
must note an important distinction between infertility and sterility; infertility simply means that
becoming pregnant is a challenge, whereas sterility means that an individual cannot "conceive a
child under any circumstance." MAYO CLINIC, Fertility Challenges and Therapies: Fertility
Drugs-Make an Educated Choice, at http://www.mayohealth.org-home?id=HQ00680 (last visited Jan. 16, 2001).
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percent of the time the woman is the infertile partner. 3 Currently,
ten to fifteen percent of American couples suffer from infertillty,54
and this figure continues to increase in the United States. 55
A. Socioeconomic Status and Infertility
Not only does infertility affect more women than men,&6 but
researchers have found that it also affects a disproportionate number of women of lower socioeconomic status. 57 Indeed, research illustrates that "women with less than a high school education (a
standard measure of lower socioeconomic status) are more likely to
be part of an infertile couple than are their more educated counterparts." 8 Furthermore, "[m]any lower income people also suffer from
poor nutrition and health care, making them more likely to suffer
infertility."5 9 Thus, it logically follows that many impoverished

women-who are the most likely to qualify for Medicaid benefits 60will encounter the problem of infertility; thus they are more likely
to require medical treatment in order to conceive a child.

53. MAYO CLINIC, supranote 52. According to the Mayo Clinic, ovulation disorders, such as
irregular or absent menstrual periods due to hormonal imbalances, frequently cause female
infertility. Id.; see also AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, Patient's Fact Sheet:
Infertility, at http://wvv.asrm.org/PatientsLFactSheetslAnfertility-Factpdf (last visited Jan. 16,
2001) ("[I]rregular or abnormal ovulation accounts for approximately 2505 of all female infertility
cases.").
54. MAYO CLINIC, supra note 52. Infertility is estimated to affect 6.1 million American
women and their partners. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, supra note 53.
55. Kerr, supra note 52, at 601 ("Estimates of the number of infertile couples in the United
States range from 2.4 million to 5 million and these numbers are increasing each year."); see also
John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and ProcreativeLiberty: The Legal Structure of the New
Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L REV. 939, 945 (1986) (stating that "changes in sexual behavior, work
roles, and postponement of marriage and childrearing" explain the rising rate of infertility).
Infertility is particularly on the rise for women in certain age groups: "the percentage of infertile
women between ages 35 to 39 rose from 18.406 to 24.635 (from 1966 to 1982], and the rate among
women ages 20 to 24 more than doubled, from 3.6035 in 1965 to 10.63' in 1982" Elizabeth Heitman, Infertility as a PublicHealth Problem: Why Assisted Reproductive Technologies Are Not the
Answer, 6 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 89, 93 (1995).
56. See discussion supra note 53 and accompanying text.
57. See Segvei 0. Aral & Willard Cates, Jr., The Increasing Concern with Infertility: Why
Now?, 250 JAMA 2327, 2327 (1983); see also Heitman, supranote 55, at 93.
58. Heitman, supranote 55, at 93.
59. Kerr, supra note 52, at 605. Some causes of infertility include strenuous exercise and
"eating disorders .... poor nutrition, stress, smoking, and alcohol and drug use." Id. at 602.
60. States are required to provide Medicaid services to the "categorically needy," which includes those individuals living below the poverty level. See discussion supra notes 11-15 and
accompanying text.
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B. Female FertilityDrug Treatments
The medical community has developed a multitude of techniques in an attempt to diminish infertility.61 For the purposes of
this Note, however, only currently available fertility drugs will be
drugs cadiscussed, because of their classification as prescription
62
pable of being covered by state Medicaid programs.
For a woman to become pregnant, the processes of ovulation
and fertilization must occur to completion. 63 Ovulation disorders in
women frequently prevent the completion of these processes,
thereby resulting in infertility.64 Fertility drugs use various mechanisms to regulate or induce ovulation; most typically, they create
signals designed to replace the signals provided by natural folliclestimulating and lutenizing hormones. 65 The most commonly used
fertility drugs for treating ovulation disorders in women include:

61. See Kerr, supra note 52, at 602 (stating that standard infertility treatments include
"hormones, fertility drugs, and tubal surgery"); Robertson, supra note 55, at 942 C'Tihere is a
vast array of infertility treatments, ranging from fertility drugs to tubal reconstruction by microsurgery and artificial insemination."); see also Roger J. Chin, Assisted Reproductive Technologies
Legal Issues in Procreation,LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 190, 192-94 (1996) (discussing various techniques of artificial insemination known as "assisted reproductive technologies"); STADLANDERS
PHARMACY, TREATMENT OF INFERTILITY: CURRENTLY AVAILABLE DRUGS, at http://www.stadtland
er.com/fertility/fertilmeds.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2000) (describing available forms of fertility
drugs) [hereinafter TREATMENT OF INFERTILITY].
62. States may opt to include FDA-approved prescription drugs in their state Medicaid pro.
grams. 42 U.S.C. §1396d(a)(12) (1994).
63. During ovulation, a "follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) is secreted by a woman's pituitary gland, signaling the ovaries to mature an egg follicle .... ." MAYO CLINIC, supra note 52.
When at least one of the follicles has reached maturity, the pituitary gland releases a substance
called lutenizing hormone ("LI-'). Id. The LH then carries the message to the largest matured
follicle to release its egg, and the egg is picked up by the fallopian tube. Id. Fertilization occurs
when sperm unites with the egg in the fallopian tube. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. See generallydiscussion supra note 63.
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clomiphene citrate,66 gonadotropins with GnRH agonsists, 67 progesterone,68 bromocriptine, 69 and corticosteroids.7 0
C. FederalRequirements for State Medicaid Coverage of Fertility
Drugs
State coverage of prescription drugs, including fertility

drugs, is an optional service that any state can elect to provide
through its Medicaid program. 71 Although the federal Medicaid program provides that a state should cover all FDA-approved prescription drugs if it elects to cover prescription drugs in its Medicaid
program, 72 federal law allows states to refuse coverage of fertility
73
drugs.
Currently, all state Medicaid programs, as well as the Dis-

trict of Columbia's Medicaid program, offer prescription drug coverage. 74 Yet, very few state Medicaid programs include fertility drugs

66. The trade names for clomiphene citrate are clomid and serophene. ADVANCED
REPRODUCTIVE CARE (ARC), HORMONAL THERAPY, at http:vlww.fertilityusa.com/hormone-

therapy.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2001) [hereinafter HORMONALTHERAPY]. The drug
blocks estrogen receptors in a part of the brain called the hypothamalus, which
causes the hypothalamus to signal the pituitary gland to release more FSH
(follicle stimulating hormone) and LH (luteinizing hormone) into the bloodstream. The increased levels of FSH lead to the development of the follicle and
egg which secretes more estrogen into the bloodstream.
Id. The elevated levels of estrogen in the blood trigger an LH surge, and the LH surge then
triggers ovulation. Id.
67. Brand names for gonadotropins with GnRH agonists include Pergonal, Humegon, Repronex, Gonal F, and Follistim. Id. These drugs act directly on the ovaries, stimulating follicle
growth and maturation by imitating the body's natural FSH. Id.
68. The trade names for progesterone include Crinone, Suppositories, Prometrium, and Troches. See TREATMENT OF INFERTILITY, supra note 61. Progesterone is prescribed when the body's
natural supply of progesterone is insufficient. Id. The drug "prepares the uterus to receive a
fertilized egg for implantation and then acts to maintain the corpus luteum during pregnancy."
Id.
69. The brand names for bromocriptine include parlodel and pergolide. Bromocriptine lowers the levels of prolactin-a hormone produced by the pituitary gland that promotes lactationin a woman's body, thereby preventing irregular menstrual cycles. HORMONAL THERAPY, supra
note 66.
70. Corticosteroids lower the levels of androgens--male type hormones-in a woman's body,
promoting normal follicular development and ovulation. Id.
71. See discussion supranote 24 and accompanying text.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(2)(A) (1994).
73. Id. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(B)(2)(B) (allowing a state to exclude drugs that promote fertility from
coverage in state Medicaid programs).
74. See Schlosberg & Jerath, supranote 21; see also NAT'L GCR. FORPOLICY ANALYSIS, supra
note 5 ("Vhile states may decide whether or not to pay for prescription drugs, every state has
chosen to do so."); Robert Pear, White House PlansMedicaid Coverage of Viagra by States, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1998, at Al CStates do not have to cover prescription drugs under Medicaid, the
health program for low-income people, but all states do so, in part because drugs reduce the use
of hospitals and other costly services.").
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in their prescription drug coverage. 75 As a result, infertile women

who are denied coverage for fertility drugs under their state Medicaid programs must forego treatment altogether, 76 frequently leaving them unable to conceive a child.
IV. MEDICAID COVERAGE OF VIAGRA

Viagra 77 is an oral medication commonly used to treat erectile dysfunction. 78 The drug works by blocking phosphodiesterase 5,
the enzyme that breaks down the chemical mediators of erection. 79
By allowing the chemical mediators of erection to last longer,
Viagra helps improve the blood flow into the penis, thereby creating
erections in men who would otherwise be impotent.80
A. FederalRequirements for State Medicaid Coverage of Viagra
On July 2, 1998, the United States Department of Health
and Human Services sent a letter to the nation's governors ordering
them to pay for the costs of Viagra under their state Medicaid programs.81 Prior to the Department of Health and Human Services
mandate, at least a dozen states had decided not to reimburse for
the cost of Viagra under their Medicaid programs. 82
The head of the HCFA83 told the nation's governors that the
provisions of Title XIX mandated coverage of Viagra.8 4 She rea-

75. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 5 (stating that virtually none
of the states cover fertility treatments for women); Miller, supra note 5 (asserting that states
objecting to mandatory Medicaid coverage of Viagra have pointed out that few Medicaid pro.
grams cover infertility treatments for women).
76. These women must forego treatment because they cannot afford to pay the costs out of
their own pockets.
77. Viagra, whose generic is Sildenafil, has been approved by the FDA. CENTER FOR MALE
REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE (CMR,
WHAT's NEW, at http:fl www.malereproduction.com/whatsnew.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2001) [hereinafter What's New].
78. Id. Erectile dysfunction, also referred to as impotence, is the "inability of a man to
achieve or maintain an erection." CENTER FOR MALE REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE (CMRM),
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.malereproduction.com /faq.htm Qast visited Jan.
16, 2001).
79. WHAT'S NEW, supra note 77.
80. Id. "Viagra can work in up to 70% of men with impotence." Id.
81. "Any state Medicaid program that pays for prescription medicines must also pay for the
expensive male impotence drug." NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 5.
82. See id.; see also Amy Goldstein, U.S. Tells States to Cover Viagra PrescriptionsUnder
Medicaid,WASH. POST, July 3, 1998, at A21.
83. Nancy-Ann Minn DeParle was the acting head of the HCFA at the time the letter was
distributed.
84. Goldstein, supranote 82, atA21.
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soned that Viagra had been approved by the FDA for the treatment
of impotence and that impotence drugs were not allowed to be excluded from coverage pursuant to the statute because they were
"medically necessary."85 Furthermore, she informed the states that
they would be free to set limits on how many pills patients could get
in each prescription and on how many refills patients could
receive. 8
State governors responded extremely negatively to the
HCFA's mandate. 87 Estimates concluded that the directive will add
$100 to $200 million dollars nationwide to states' Medicaid expenses. 88 Many view the added expense as diverting funds "from
other important health programs such as maternal and child welfare, H.I.V., and programs for the disabled so that roughly 10% of
Medicaid recipients 9 can have adequate sex lives."90 Furthermore,
the states asserted that the mandate placed them in the "untenable
position of covering Viagra for men while virtually none of them
cover birth control or infertility treatments for women." 91 Finally,
the states argued that the exception in Title XIX that permits
states to exclude coverage of drugs used to promote fertility92 applies to Viagra, and, thus, the HCFA's mandated coverage of Viagra

93
violates the express provisions of Title XIX.

B. Viagra as a FertilityDrug
The states' contention that Viagra should be considered a
fertility drug has merit. Dissenters argue that Viagra primarily
treats erectile dysfunction 94 and that it does not have any known

85. Id. For a listing of drugs specifically excluded from mandatory coverage by the statute,
see the discussion supranote 30.

86. Id.
87.
88.

Stewart. supra note 2, at 612-13.
N-AT'L Cr. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, supranote 5 (citing estimates provided by the Ameri-

can Public Welfare Association).
89. "[Ninety percent] of Medicaid beneficiaries are women and children'

Stewart, supra

note 2, at 626.
90. Id.

91. Goldstein, supra note 82 atA21.
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(2)(B) (1994) ("The following drugs or classes of drugs, or their
medical uses, may be excluded from coverage or otherwise restricted:... [a]gents when used to
promote fertility.").

93. Goldstein, supra note 82 ("[Sltates argue that the exception for fertility drugs should
pertain to Viagra').
94. See discussion supranote 78 and accompanying text.
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effect on sperm production, shape, movement, or count. 95 However,
a man can be infertile simply because he cannot achieve an erection, regardless of whether he has a deficiency in sperm production,
shape, movement, or count. Indeed, a man unable to maintain or
achieve an erection is also unable to release the sperm necessary
for the fertilization process.9 6 By restoring potency to men suffering
from erectile dysfunction, Viagra can increase the probability that
conception will be achieved. 97 Because of its ability to assist an otherwise impotent man in impregnating a woman, Viagra necessarily
constitutes a fertility drug.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE EXCLUSION OF
FERTILITY DRUGS FROM MEDICAID COVERAGE IN LIGHT OF
THE MANDATED MEDICAID COVERAGE OF VIAGRA
The classification of Viagra as a fertility drug raises severe
constitutional implications for states that must now cover Viagra,
yet continue to refuse coverage of female fertility drugs under their
Medicaid programs. In attempting to force state Medicaid programs
to cover fertility drugs, female Medicaid recipients can attack the
constitutionality of the programs' current distribution of benefits.
Because all state action must satisfy the constitutional requirements of both substantive due process and equal protection, 98 these
recipients can certainly allege that the state Medicaid programs
violate both of these constitutional requirements.
A. Substantive Due Process Claims
The first attack on a state's failure to provide coverage for
prescription fertility drugs is to maintain that such failure constitutes a violation of substantive due process. 99 Female Medicaid re-

95. Mark Perloe, Viagra & Fertility, at http://www.allhealth.com/content/0,1625,69.
70,00.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2001).
96. See supraPart III.A.2 (discussing the fertilization process).
97. Perloe, supra note 95 C"iagra may improve the chances for achieving conception."),
However, simply by increasing potency, Viagra does not necessarily induce the ejaculation necossary for fertilization; the drug may simply increase rigidity. Id. Still, Viagra may restore a man's
ability to ejaculate in some cases. Id.
98. Thomas R. McCoy, Recent Equal ProtectionDecisions-FundamentalRight to Travel or
"Newcomers"as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. Rev. 987, 988 (1975).
99. The right to general substantive due process was first recognized in the case of Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The guarantee of substantive due process applies directly to the
federal government through the Fifth Amendment and, as a result of the incorporation doctrine,
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 53-54. The constitutional
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cipients seeking fertility drugs would argue that a state's refusal to
cover these drugs in its Medicaid program interferes with a
woman's fundamental right to procreate. In establishing a constitutionally recognized right to procreation for substantive due process
purposes, these women must argue that the right to privacy"O
found in the Constitution encompasses procreation. 10
Even if women succeed in persuading the Court that the
right to privacy includes a right to procreate, however, any substantive due process claim would fail. While the Due Process Clause
forbids the State from depriving an individual of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law," 0 2 the Clause "generally confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid
may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of
which the government itself may not deprive the individual." 10 3
Thus, a state actor does not have any constitutional obligation to

right to substantive due process ensures that laws cannot "impinge upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980).
100. The seminal case recognizing a right to privacy is Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479
(1965). In Griswold, the Court held that a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to
married couples violated the couples' constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 485-86. Justice
Douglas, who delivered the opinion of the Court, found that the right to privacy existed in the
"penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Id. at 484.
101. For a general discussion of the constitutionally recognized right to procreation, see
Chin, supra note 61, at 198-215. A number of cases support the argument that the right to privacy encompasses the right to procreation. First, in Eisenstadtv. Baird, the Court stated that "if
the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, marriedor single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Einstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). Second, in Carey v. Population Services International,the Court stated that "the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State... [and] it [is] clear that among the decisions that an individual
may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions 'relating to marriage; procreation; contraception; family relationships; and child rearing and education.': Carey
v. Population Servs. Intfl, 431 U.S. 678, 684-87 (1977). Third, in Skinner v'. Oklahoma, the Court
stated that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
103. Chin, supra note 61, at 215 (referring to the Court's decision in DoShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)). Several cases have recognized the lack of
affirmative obligation by the government with respect to reproductive services. In Maher v. Roe,
the Court noted that "[t]he Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses
of the indigents.' Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977). Furthermore, in Harrisv. IcRae, the
Court stated that "[a]lthough the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection
against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain
personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize
all the advantages of that freedom." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980).
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either provide fertility drugs or to fund them, 10 4 and the substantive
due process claim is largely without merit.
B. Equal Protection Claims
With the failure of their substantive due process argument,
the female Medicaid recipients should instead focus on an equal
protection claim. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."'1 5 In essence, any time a state actor makes a
law resulting in a favored and a disfavored class, a potential equal
protection problem arises.' 06 The recipients could argue that the
provisions regarding Medicaid coverage of Viagra and fertility
drugs clearly favor men over women, and, accordingly, the regulation must either be altered so that it mandates coverage of fertility
drugs for women, or that the government must retract the requirement that states provide Medicaid coverage of Viagra.
1. The Traditional Equal Protection Construct
Judicial precedent has established a traditional equal protection construct identifying the factors that the Court takes into
account when deciding whether a regulation violates the constitutional guarantee to equal protection. Namely, the Court examines
three factors in making its decision: whether an inequality of
treatment exists; the nature of the right affected by the inequality;
07
and whether the inequality is based on a suspect classification.'

a. Determining Whether an Inequality of Treatment Exists
The first step in any equal protection case involves the determination of whether a given law treats two classes of people dif-

104. See Chin, supra note 61, at 215 (recognizing that a state neither has to fund nor provide
reproductive services).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
106. Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v.Virginia'sNew Gender Equal Protection Analysis with Ramificationsfor Pregnancy,Parenting,and Title VII, 50 VAND. L. REV. 845,
858 (1997).
107. See generally McCoy, supra note 98 (analyzing recent equal protection decisions involving "newcomers" and the fundamental right to travel).
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ferently.108 The Court typically does not find that an inequality exists when a regulation disadvantages an "opt-in/opt-out" class;1 0 9

however, if the Court detects that the class affected by the regulation cannot readily change the characteristic that initially subjected
them to the regulation, the Court will likely find that the class is
not "opt-in/opt-out" and that an inequality of treatment exists.11 0
Furthermore, if the Court can detect a discriminatory purpose for
the regulation, it will likely find that an inequality of treatment
exists."1 In the majority of equal protection cases, the Court finds
an inequality of treatment; however, the possibility always remains
11 2
that they will decline to do so.

108. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (discussing a regulation which distinguishes between "advertisements of products sold by the owner of [a] truck" as
opposed to "general advertisements").
109. An opt-in/opt-out class is one in which the members may freely choose to be affected by
the regulation. See id. at 109 (The regulation prohibited truck owners from advertising anything
other than their own products.).
110. For example, in Railway Express Agency, Ina v. New York, a city ordinance banning
rented vehicular advertising, yet continuing to allow truck owners to advertise their own businesses on their trucks, was challenged on equal protection grounds. Id. at 106. Although the
argument could be made that this regulation only affected an opt-inlopt-out class because any
individual was free to buy his own truck and engage in vehicular advertising, the Court still
found that an inequality of treatment existed as a result of the regulation. Id. at 109. In doing
so, the Court implied that it was willing to overlook the fact that a class could technically be
described as opt-in/opt-out when an individual had already opted-in to a particular class before
the state enacted the regulation and, therefore, there was a smell of permanence about the class
because its membership was defined independently of the regulation. See id. at 110-11; see generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding that a state statute providing for mandatory sterilization of three-time felons convicted of felonies involving moral turpitude resulted
in an inequality of treatment because, although felons could technically choose to commit felonies involving moral turpitude and thereby place themselves in the affected class, felons who had
entered the class prior to enactment of the law could not choose to opt-in or opt-out).
111. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668-70 (1966). In Harper v. Virginia
State Board of Elections, an equal protection challenge was brought against Virginia's imposition
of $1.50 poll tax. Id. at 664 & n.1. Although the classes affected by the poll tax could be described
as opt-in/opt-out, because anybody could choose to pay the $1.50 and vote, the Court found that
an inequality of treatment did exist in the regulation. See id. at 668-70. In doing so, the Court
seemed to focus on the exclusionary purpose of the regulation. See id. Clearly, the regulation
sought to keep the poor away from the polls, and, since the poor were comprised largely of racial
minorities, courts could infer an intent to discourage racial minorities from voting. See id.
112. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (holding that requiring advocates of
low-income housing to get approval from both the legislature and local municipalities to effect
change did not violate equal protection). In James v. Vallierra, the plaintiffs challenged a state
constitutional requirement that advocates of low-income housing had to get approval from both
the legislature and the local municipality, while advocates of other subsidized housing only had
to get approval from the legislature. Id. at 139. The Court rejected the equal protection claim. Id.
at 142-43. It is possible that the Court applied the rational basis test and the requirement failed
it. However, the fact that the Court never referenced the appropriate standard of scrutiny creates a strong possibility that the Court actually determined that there was no inequality in
making groups who have been the "losers" in the majoritarian process go through extra electoral
hurdles.
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b. Classificationof the Interest Affected by the Unequal Treatment
Assuming the Court finds an inequality of treatment, it next
evaluates the type of interest affected by the inequality. The Courts
recognize two types of interest for equal protection purposes: fundamental interests and non-fundamental interests. Fundamental
interests for equal protection purposes necessarily encompass all
3
rights deemed fundamental for substantive due process purposes,"
but, for the most part, the Court uses its subjective judgment to
decide whether a right should be classified as fundamental for
equal protection purposes. 114 Furthermore, the Court has held that
a state benefit scheme cannot be considered a fundamental right for
equal protection purposes." 5 Economic interests also tend to be
classified as non-fundamental rights for equal protection
purposes. 116

Once the Court classifies the interest affected by the unequal
treatment, it applies a standard of scrutiny to the challenged regulation based on that classification. A regulation that creates unequal treatment affecting a non-fundamental interest receives the
rational basis test: The Court determines whether the regulation
serves a legitimate government interest and whether the means
117
used are rationally related to the achievement of that interest.
The rational basis test affords a high level of judicial deference to

113. While the Founding Fathers created the legislature to interfere with individual rights,
they did not intend for the legislature to interfere with individual rights unequally. Thomas R.
McCoy, Address to the Vanderbilt Law School Constitutional Law II Class (Oct. 21, 1999). Thus,
there should necessarily be a longer list of fundamental rights in equal protection cases than in
substantive due prpcess cases because the legislature should be subjected to strict scrutiny when
it attempts to interfere with individual rights unequally. Id.
114. See Kay, supra note 15, at 370 n.83 (noting that "[r]ights are identified as 'fundamental'
based on a substantive decision by the Court') (citation omitted).
115. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1973). In Rodriguez, a state scheme of funding public education based on district property taxes and distributing
more money to districts that paid more in property taxes faced a challenge on equal protection
grounds. Id. at 5-6. In addressing the issue of whether public education was a fundamental right,
the Court stated that the key to deciding whether a right is fundamental lies in determining
whether that right is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 33. The
Court next reasoned that public education was a state benefit and, therefore, was neither explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. at 35-36. Accordingly, the Court refused to
recognize the right to public education as a fundamental right. Id. at 33-36.
116. See generally Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (refusing to af.
ford the heightened scrutiny of the compelling interest test to a regulation that prohibited rented
vehicular advertising, thereby implying that the individual interest in rental income at stake
was not fundamental for equal protection purposes).
117. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55 (stating that the rational basis test to be applied when dealing
with a non-fundamental right is "whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state interest or purpose").
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the legislature, and very rarely does a state regulation not pass the
rational basis test. Alternatively, a regulation that creates unequal
treatment affecting a fundamental interest receives the compelling

governmental interest test: The Court decides whether the regulation serves a compelling government interest and whether the

means are narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.118
c. Unequal Treatment Based on a Suspect Classification
When considering whether a regulation's inequality of
treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause, the Court also
looks to see if the regulation creates a suspect classification. Although the government "may classify individuals or 'draw lines'
when creating and implementing certain laws," any groupings that

are arbitrary or based on impermissible criteria are deemed suspect
classifications. 119
In determining whether a regulation creates a suspect classification, the Court first inquires whether the classification affects a

"suspect class." Traditional equal protection doctrine finds a suspect class exists if the class meets three criteria: 120 (1) the class has
an immutable characteristic; 12 1 (2) the class is a political minority; 12 2 and (3) the class has been traditionally disadvantaged. 123
If the Court finds that the inequality created by the regula-

tion does not affect a suspect class, it applies the rational basis test
to the regulation. 124 Conversely, if the classification does affect a

118. Id. at 31 (stating that when a regulation penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right,
the regulation must be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest).
119. Kay, supra note 15, at 369.
120. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (stating that suspect classes are comprised of
members who have been subjected to discrimination, who exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group, and who are a minority or politically powerless).
121. An immutable characteristic is one "not susceptible to change; unchanging or unchangeable." AM. HERITAGE DIcTIONARY 346 (2d ed. 1983). In Frontiero v. Richardson, when
determining whether women constituted a suspect class, the Court stated that immutable characteristics are "determined solely by the accident of birth." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
686 (1973).
122. The Court deems a class a political minority if the group is "incapable of protecting its
interests through the usual political process." McCoy, supra note 98, at 1017. The "traditional
indicia of suspectness" are that the class be "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 28.
123. A class is traditionally disadvantaged if it suffers from a "long history of irrational or
unnecessary legal discrimination." McCoy, supranote 98, at 1020.
124. See id. at 993 ("Any inequality in the treatment accorded two separate classes of persons
by the state must be rationally related to the effectuation of a legitimate state interest.").
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suspect class, the Court affords the regulation a higher standard of
scrutiny. 125 The level of heightened scrutiny applied by the Court
when it finds that a suspect classification exists may be either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny, depending on whether the
Court classifes the underlying suspect class as clearly suspect 126 or
quasi-suspect. 12 7 If the Court finds the underlying suspect class to
be clearly suspect, it affords the regulation the strict scrutiny of the
compelling government interest test, looking to see whether the
regulation serves a compelling government interest and whether
the means used to achieve this legislative goal are narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 28 On the other hand, if the Court discovers that the underlying suspect class is merely quasi-suspect,
the regulation only receives intermediate scrutiny, and the government must show "that the classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are
'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' "129
2. The Equal Protection Problem Created by State Medicaid
Programs Covering Viagra While Excluding Other Fertility
Drugs
In challenging mandated Medicaid coverage of Viagra, female Medicaid recipients would need to convince the Court that a
state refusing to provide Medicaid coverage for female fertility
drugs while providing Medicaid coverage for Viagra denies the recipients' their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
The recipients would first argue that an inequality of treatment
does in fact exist as a result of the coverage discrepancies. If the
Court accepts the contention that an inequality of treatment exists,
the recipients can next argue that the Court should afford the coverage plans a heightened level of judicial scrutiny, as opposed to the

125. See id. at 992-94.
126. The Court defines a class as clearly suspect when it meets all three suspect class criteria. Currently, courts clearly treat race, alienage, and lineage as characteristics for valid suspect
classes. Id. at 991 C'[O]nly race, alienage, and lineage have been clearly established as 'suspect'
classifications for equal protection purposes.").
127. A class is likely to be deemed quasi-suspect when it meets some, but not all, of the suspect class criteria. See Thomas R. McCoy, Address to the Vanderbilt Law School Constitutional
Law II Class (Nov. 11, 1999).
128. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 56 (1973).
129. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (citation omitted).
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rational basis test, so that they increase their chances of a success130
ful outcome.
a. The Existence of an Inequality
A state Medicaid program's refusal to cover fertility drugs
while providing coverage for Viagra results in an inequality of
treatment. By providing coverage for Viagra, a state gives men who
receive Medicaid benefits and who suffer from infertility a means of
overcoming their -problem through the use of a male fertility
drug. 131 Meanwhile, women who receive Medicaid benefits and suffer from infertility cannot undergo treatment with female fertility
drugs unless they pay for the treatment themselves. 3 2 Moreover,
women cannot freely change their sex; therefore, they are not part
of an opt-in/opt-out class and cannot freely choose to be affected by
the regulatory scheme. Indeed, this bolsters the case for finding an
133
inequality of treatment.
b. The Inequality as Affecting a FundamentalRight
Due to the fact that fundamental interests for equal protection purposes encompass all rights deemed fundamental for substantive due process purposes, 134 a petitioner may argue that a
state's refusal to cover female fertility drugs under Medicaid denies
women the fundamental right to procreate. In arguing the existence
of a fundamental right to procreate for equal protection purposes, a
petitioner would reiterate and parallel the argument made in proclaiming the existence of a fundamental right to procreation for
substantive due process purposes, citing to cases such as Eisen35
stadt, Carey, and Skinner.
However, just as in substantive due process, any argument
made that the state Medicaid program's denial to women of the
fundamental right to procreate will fail. Through its Medicaid pro-

130. For an explanation of why the rational basis test decreases the chances of a successful

outcome for the recipients, see discussion supra Part V.B. .b.
131. For a discussion of Viagra as a male fertility drug, see discussion supra Part IV.B.
132. As discussed earlier in this Note, the fertility drugs currently available are designed to
correct reproductive abnormalities in women. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.

Before Viagra, men who suffered from infertility had to resort to either surgical procedures or to
artificial reproductive technologies to try and correct their problem.
133. See discussion supraPart V.B.1.a.
134. See supranote 114 and accompanying text.
135. For a discussion of these cases and their use as support for the notion that a fundamental right to procreate exists, see supranote 101.
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gram, the state distributes a benefit to individuals, and the Court
has explicitly held that state benefit schemes cannot be considered
136
fundamental rights for equal protection purposes.
Hence, the Court would classify the interest affected by the
inequality as non-fundamental and would apply the rational basis
test,13 7 and the recipients would most likely lose under this highly
138
deferential standard.
c. The Inequality as Based on a Suspect Classification
A state Medicaid program that covers Viagra and does not
cover fertility drugs distributes benefits unequally among men and
women. 3 9 The Court has held that inequalities defined by gender
distinctions must be considered inequalities based on a suspect
classification.

140

1. The Need for a Heightened Standard of Scrutiny
The Court typically affords gender classifications the intermediate level of scrutiny 41 and requires that the "classification
serve[ ] 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' ",142 Nevertheless, in United States v. Virginia (VM),' 43 the Court indicated its willingness to deviate from

the traditional intermediate level of scrutiny when dealing with

136. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (holding that the state
benefit of public education could not be deemed a fundamental right).

137. Id. at 55 (holding that the rational basis test should be applied to an inequality affecting
a non-fundamental right).

138. Due to a high level of judicial deference to the legislature, the state passes the rational
basis test a majority of the time. See McCoy, supra note 98, at 989 (describing the rational basis
test as a "tolerant standard").

139. Men necessarily have no use for the kind of fertility drugs excluded from coverage, considering that drugs essentially treat ovulation disorders and men do not ovulate. Likewise, be-

cause Viagra treats infertility by restoring the ability to sustain an erection, women cannot use
Viagra for fertility purposes.
140. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
141. Id. at 199-200. Gender classifications are afforded an intermediate level of scrutiny
rather than the strict scrutiny of the compelling governmental interest test because women have
been identified as a "quasi-suspece' class. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(recognizing that women meet the criteria of having an immutable characteristic and being tra-

ditionally disadvantaged, but stating that women do not constitute a small and powerless minority).
142. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (citation omitted).
143. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) [hereinafter VMI] (challenging the Virginia Military Institute's male-only admissions policy).
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gender classifications. Instead of applying the intermediate level of

scrutiny, the VMI Court elevated the applicable level of scrutiny,
stating that the government must show an "exceedingly persuasive"
justification for the inequality of treatment. 1"
The VMI Court implicitly justified its heightened scrutiny of
the regulation by focusing on the history of discrimination against
women in the area of public education.'4 5 The Court stressed that
women had been deliberately excluded from educational opportuni-

ties for hundreds of years, and that even after some opportunities
were opened to women, the resources made available to women
were "far from equal" to those made available to men. 146 Thus, one
can conclude that, by raising the requisite government interest
from important to "exceedingly persuasive, 147 the VMT Court recognized the need to protect women from regulations that perpetuated a tradition of historical gender discrimination.
Just as they have faced repeated discrimination in education, women have encountered recurrent discrimination in the area

of health care. 14 The United States health care industry and medical profession have their basis in "patriarchy and a demeaning view
of women." 149 "Women's health interests have been consistently
overlooked by the legislature, and the minimal amount of women's
health care legislation passed addresses women solely in the role of

childbearer and childraiser.1 50 Repeated attempts by the government to limit impoverished women's reproductive rights serve as
even greater proof of discrimination against women in the realm of
health care.151

144. Id. at 533; cf. Craig,429 U.S. at 197 (stating that the government must show that the
inequality serves "important government objectives and must be substantially related7 to that
objective).
145. VM, 518 U.S. at 531-32
146. Id. at 538. The Court held that: "[The historical record indicates action more deliberate
than anomalous: First, protection of women against higher education; next, schools for women
far from equal in resources and stature to schools for men. ... "Id. at 538.
147. See id.
148. Susan L. Waysdor& Fightingfor their Lives: Women, Poverty, and the HistoricalRole of
United States Law in Shaping Access to Woinen's Health Care, 84 KY. LJ. 745, 746 (1995-96)
CWith regard to health care, a key sphere of life, women continue to constitute an oppressed
group, disempowered legally, politically, and as consumers in the health care system.").
149. Id. at 756.
150. Id. at 767-68. Furthermore, the government has used women's role as childbearers to
prevent women access to improved health care. See id. at 768 n.70 ([F]ederal rules and regulations have traditionally excluded women from participating in potentially beneficial clinical
research and drug trials precisely because of women's reproductive role.").
151. Beginning in 1990, multiple bills were introduced in state legislatures that attempted
to force women receiving public assistance to use Norplant, a hormonal contraceptive implant
that has a duration of five years. Sarah Gill, Discrimination,HistoricalAbuse, and the New
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Accordingly, in order to maintain consistency with the VMI
Court's reasoning that an invidious history of gender discrimination
warrants scrutiny greater than intermediate scrutiny, any inequality of treatment favoring men over women in the area of health care
must be afforded a heightened level of scrutiny because of the long
history of discrimination against women in health care policies. Indeed, the appropriate level of heightened scrutiny is precisely the
one articulated in VMI:152 whether the government can show an
"exceedingly persuasive" interest in the inequality of treatment and
whether the discriminatory means employed are substantially re153
lated to the achievement of the government's interest.
2. Applying the Standard of Scrutiny
Under the VMI standard of heightened scrutiny, the burden
falls on the state to demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for the inequality of treatment resulting from covering
Viagra while excluding coverage of female fertility drugs under
Medicaid. The state would likely advance two arguments that such
a justification exists. First, the state would assert that the substantial difference in cost between Viagra and female fertility drugs justifies the coverage discrepancy. Second, the state would argue that
Viagra is medically necessary and must be covered under Medicaid,
whereas female fertility drugs, while perhaps beneficial, are not
medically necessary.

NorplantProblem, 16 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 43, 45 (1994). One such bill conditioned receipt of
public assistance benefits on Norplant insertion, and another bill provided financial incentives
for low-income women who agreed to use Norplant. See id. Likewise, several bills offered recipi.
ents of Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits similar incentives to either obtain depo
provera injections or become sterilized. See id.
152. The argument has been made that gender classifications should receive the same level
of scrutiny as racial classifications: the strict scrutiny of the compelling governmental interest
test. E.g., Kay, supra note 15, at 372-80 (advocating applying strict scrutiny to gender classifications). This has not been a winning argument, however, and it appears that the greatest chance
for obtaining anything greater than intermediate scrutiny from the Court involves waging a VMI
argument.
153. This level of scrutiny is actually a hybrid of intermediate scrutiny and "exceedingly persuasive scrutiny." The "exceedingly persuasive" interest replaces the intermediate level of scrutiny's "important governmental objective," but the remainder of the intermediate level of scrutiny, which addresses whether the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to
the achievement of that interest, remains the same. The VMI Court only heightened the government interest requirement; they did not mention any changes as to the relation the means
must have to achieving the interest and, thus, it is assumed that the means requirement remained the same.
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With regard to its first argument, the state would emphasize
the fact that Viagra costs ten dollars a pill,'54 while female fertility
drug treatments can cost up to three thousand dollars before conception is achieved. 155 The state would then argue that Medicaid
coverage of female fertility drugs would divert a tremendous
amount of funds from other important aspects of the program, such
as child welfare and programs for the disabled. While this argument sounds credible on its face, a close examination of the actual
circumstances surrounding the use of the various drugs by Medicaid recipients illustrates its downfalls.
Although Viagra costs only ten dollars a pill, men may use
Viagra multiple times a month. 56 States can limit the amount of
Viagra a recipient receives each month, 57 but, even then, the recipient still will likely receive at least four pills per month. 158 Furthermore, men can use Viagra throughout their life spans.159 Thus,
the actual cost of providing Viagra could potentially reach at least
four hundred and eighty dollars a year over several years. 160
Meanwhile, fertility drugs may be used only during the years
that a woman menstruates and will only be taken if a woman attempts to conceive a child. Very few female Medicaid recipients will
make use of the coverage of fertility drugs in comparison to the
number of male Medicaid recipients who will seek coverage for
Viagra. 161 Low-income women, who are the most likely to face infertility problems, 162 are the least likely to seek infertility services. 1'
Although some of the reluctance to seek infertility treatments results from the unavailability of coverage for such treatments, lowincome women, in general, are less likely to see infertility as a
medical problem and, therefore, are less likely to view it as a correctable condition.' 4 Hence, even if Medicaid coverage is made

154. See ViagraMay be Linked to Six Heart Deaths, 14 No. 1 ANDREWS PHARMI.LITIG. REP. 3
(June 1998), at httpJ/wvw.westlaw.com.
155. See Kerr,supra note 52, at 605.
156. Because Viagra enables men to achieve and maintain an erection, it becomes necessary

for impotent men to use it whenever they desire to have sex.
157. See Viagra May be Linked to Six HeartDeaths,supra note 154.
158. See Miller, supranote 5 (stating that some insurers limit use to four pills per month).
159. This is in contrast to a woman's limited use for fertility drugs.
160. This number was derived by multiplying the ten dollars a pill by an estimated four al.
lowed pills a month for twelve months.
161. See infra note 163.

162. See Heitman, supra note 55, at 93; see also discussion supraPart M.A.1.
163. See Heitman, supra note 55, at 93 (noting that only 8% of poor women sought specialized fertility services, compared with 32% of affluent women).
164. Id.
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available for female fertility drugs, it remains unlikely that a large
number of female Medicaid recipients will make use of those services and, accordingly, the cost of supplying fertility drugs under
Medicaid will not be consuming.
The states' contention that providing Viagra coverage under
Medicaid costs less than providing fertility drugs is true only if one
does not actually consider all of the circumstances surrounding the
use of the various drugs. Once all of the information is examined,
however, it becomes clear that paying for Viagra could actually cost
the state more over time than paying for female fertility drug
treatments. Considering this fact, the Court should not find that a
state's claim that the cost difference among the drug treatments
constitutes an exceedingly persuasive justification for the inequality created by the contrasting coverage schemes.
The state would next attempt to persuade the Court that fertility drugs for women should not be covered because they are not
medically necessary, whereas Viagra is necessary to treat a medical
condition. The state's argument would likely focus on the claim that
Viagra is used to treat erectile dysfunction, a disease that makes a
man unable to achieve and sustain an erection. The state would
contend that any effect that Viagra has in treating infertility is secondary to its intended use for impotence and that Viagra cannot
accurately be classified as a fertility drug. Meanwhile, the state
would also attempt to convince the Court that infertility is not a
disease, and, thus, the use of fertility drugs is not medically necessary.
These arguments can be defeated rather easily. Several
courts have officially defined "disease", and the definitions advanced have included "[a] deviation from the healthy or normal
condition of any of the functions . . . of the body," and "[a] disturbance in function or structure of any ... part of the body." 165 Thus,
because any person suffering from infertility obviously has an abnormal reproductive system, there is accordingly no doubt that infertility is, and should be treated as, a disease.

[M]any poor and non-white women who have endured other hardships and who
consequently may not focus on issues of personal control, may experience infertility more in terms of general adversity. If infertility is one in a series of negative, seemingly irreversible events in a woman's life, she may be more likely to
attribute it to fate or God's will than to seek to address it through science.
Id. at 94.
165. Kerr, supra note 52, at 607 (quoting Order of the United Commercial Travelers v.Nicholson, 9 F.2d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1925), Blalock v. City of Portland, 291 P.2d 218, 221 (Or. 1955)).
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Furthermore, fertility drugs for women are a medical necessity if these women wish to ever become pregnant. Infertile women
cannot remedy their condition without fertility drugs or other fertility treatments, such as in vitro fertilization. Some commentators
have argued that, because fertility drugs do not cure a women's reproductive abnormalities but instead provide temporary relief from
the problem, the drugs cannot be considered a medical necessity. 16
This argument is self-defeating, however, as it destroys the assertion that Viagra is medically necessary. 167 Viagra does not permanently cure erectile dysfunction; it merely provides temporary relief
from the problem so that a man can have sexual intercourse. Thus,
if the state does proceed with this line of reasoning, the Court
should be able to clearly see the hypocrisy in the states' assertions
that infertility is not a disease and that fertility drugs are not
medically necessary. As a result, the Court should again refuse to
acknowledge this distinction as a persuasive justification for the
inequality of treatment. Accordingly, the state will have failed to
meet its burden of producing any exceedingly persuasive justification for covering Viagra under Medicaid while refusing to cover
other forms of fertility drugs for women. 16
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to the state's failure to produce an exceedingly persuasive interest that is served by the inequality of treatment, courts
must mandate that, in order to correct the state's violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, any state covering Viagra under its Medicaid program must also cover fertility drugs for women. Of course,
because all states are required to cover Viagra by HCFA mandate,
this means that all states will thus be required to amend their
Medicaid programs to cover fertility drugs.
Following such a ruling, the state may attempt to avoid covering fertility drugs by challenging HCFA-mandated Viagra coverage. The state will allege that the HFCA's mandate that state
Medicaid programs cover should be revoked because it violates the

166. E.g., Kinzie v. Physician's Liab. Ins. Co., 750 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987)

(holding that in vitro fertilization procedures were not medically necessary for purposes of insurance coverage because they do not cure or preserve a woman's health and because it is not medically necessary to a woman's health to have a baby).
167. The argument that Viagra is medically necessary has been advanced by the Department

of Health and Human Services. E.g., Pear, supranote 74 at Al.
168. Because no legitimate exceedingly persuasive interest served by the inequality will be
advanced by the state and accepted by the Court, there will be no need for the Court to even
inquire into whether the means chosen serve the exceedingly persuasive government interest.
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Equal Protection Clause by failing to also provide mandatory coverage for female fertility drugs. 16 9 In this sense, the state will make
the same argument to the Court that the female Medicaid recipients wanting coverage for fertility drugs made: In order to be con-

stitutional, mandated coverage of Viagra must be accompanied by

170
mandated coverage of fertility drugs.

In the face of such a challenge, it is probable that the HCFA
will rethink its mandate. Requiring states to cover both Viagra and
other fertility drugs would be very costly to state Medicaid programs. 17 ' Moreover, taxpayers have been resistant to the coverage
of these types of programs, 172 and, as a government agency, the

HCFA must take public response into account when making its de3

cisions.17

Hence, a successful challenge to a state's refusal to cover fertility drugs for women while providing Viagra to men could result
in either mandated coverage for both Viagra and fertility drugs, or
may have the converse effect of eliminating coverage for both
Viagra as well as fertility drugs. Either one of these outcomes, regardless of its desirability, would in fact rectify the equal protection
problem inherent in the current scheme of funding.
Erin Lynn Connolly*

169. As one commentator observed, "The standard of judicial review used for both the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services' and the Administrator of the Health Care
Financing Administration's decisions regarding the Medicaid program has generally been that of
'arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.'" Stewart, supra note 2, at 621-22. For a more detailed discussion of the procedures necessary to challenge a federal Medicaid mandate, see supra Part II.E.
170. For a discussion of states' options in challenging the HCFA's mandated Medicaid coverage of Viagra, independent of the equal protection argument, see generally Stewart, supra
note 2.
171. See discussion supra notes 156-160.
172. Heitman, supra note 55, at 91.
The public [has] objected most strongly to coverage for the treatment of [ infertility: 63% of the 260 women receiving fertility drugs ... already had one or
more children, and 2 had 8 children each. Critics of the program insisted that
the desire to have children was not a medical problem, and that treating infertility at state expense worked against society's interest in preventing the birth
of children who would be dependent on public assistance.
Id.
173. The HCFA necessarily considers the public's response to its decisions because the
agency is accountable to the President of the United States, and the President typically views the
public's response as important for re-election purposes.
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